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TRAPPED IN THE GREENHOUSE?:
REGULATING CARBON DIOXIDE AFTER FDA
V. BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORP.
J. CHRISTOPHER BAIRD
Many have hidden for too long behind what we do not know or the
uncertainties around climate change. Their shield is shrinking. The
time has come for us to accept what is known and start to solve this
highly complex problem. As many of the top scientists throughout
the world have stated, the sooner we start to reduce these emissions,
1
the better off we will be in the future.
U.S. Senator John McCain

INTRODUCTION
The policy debate over the appropriateness of environmental
laws and regulations is often dominated by the notion that mitigation
of environmental harms must come at the expense of economic
development. The tradeoff between environmental regulation and
economic development particularly impedes efforts to halt global
climate change, because it requires policymakers to balance the risks
and uncertainties associated with a changing climate against the costs
of making the world less dependent on fossil fuels. The Kyoto
Protocol,2 a comprehensive effort by the international community to
address the problem of global climate change, is an attempt to strike
this balance by imposing caps on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions
Copyright © 2004 by J. Christopher Baird.
1. Press Release, Senator John McCain, Senate Casts Historic Vote on McCainLieberman Global Warming Bill: Despite Narrow Loss, Growing Support for Action Seen as
Encouraging, at http://mccain.senate.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=Newscenter.ViewPressRelease
&Content_id=1171 (Oct. 31, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
2. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22.
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3
from many countries. But more than a decade after its drafting, the
agreement has yet to enter into force.4 The United States, the world’s
most prolific per capita emitter of greenhouse gases (GHGs),5 has
6
refused to ratify the treaty, and Russia until very recently expressed
serious reservations as well.7 Even if Russia ratifies the treaty and it
enters into force, it will not bind the United States.8
Because of the uncertainty surrounding the Kyoto Protocol, the
problem of global climate change is alive and well. It is widely
accepted in the scientific community that increased concentrations of
GHGs, including CO2, methane, and others, are slowly causing an
increase in the mean global temperature.9 Despite this consensus

3. See id. art. 3 (“The Parties included in Annex I shall . . . ensure that their aggregate
anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed . . . do not
exceed their assigned amounts . . . .” ).
4. The Kyoto Protocol “shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date on which
not less than 55 Parties to the Convention, incorporating Annex I Parties which accounted in
total for at least 55% of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 from that group,” have
ratified, accepted, approved, or acceded to the treaty. United Nations Framework Convention
on
Climate
Change,
The
Convention
and
Kyoto
Protocol,
at
http://unfccc.int/resource/convkp.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal). Although 124 countries have ratified or acceded to the treaty, id., the treaty will not
enter into force until Annex I countries accounting for at least 55 percent of the Annex I
group’s CO2 emissions ratify the treaty. Id. Annex I countries that already have ratified the
treaty account for 44.2 percent of 1990 CO2 emissions of this group of countries. If either the
United States or Russia were to ratify, the 55 percent threshold would be met. United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol Thermometer, at
http://unfccc.int/resource/kpthermo_if.html (July 29, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
5. Envtl.
Prot.
Agency,
Global
Warming—Emissions:
Individual,
at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/emissionsindividual.html (last modified
Jan. 7, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
6. Alex Rodriguez, Russia Balks at Backing Kyoto, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 3, 2003, at C1.
7. Id. In a recent and surprising development, the Russian cabinet endorsed the Kyoto
Protocol, sending it to Parliament for approval. Seth Mydans & Andrew C. Revkin, With
Russia’s Nod, Treaty on Emissions Clears Last Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2004, at A1. Both
the lower and upper houses of the Russian Parliament have approved the treaty, which will
enter into force ninety days after the ratification documents are transmitted to the United
Nations. Steven Myers, Putin Ratifies Kyoto Protocol on Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2004, at
A10.
8. Mydans & Revkin, supra note 7.
9. Naomi Oreskes, The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 306 SCIENCE 1686, 1686
(2004). For a detailed discussion of the scientific basis for global climate change predictions, see
generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE
SCIENTIFIC BASIS (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 2001).
The SAR [Second Assessment Report] concluded: “The balance of evidence
suggests a discernible human influence on global climate.” That report also noted that
the anthropogenic signal was still emerging from the background of natural climate
variability. Since the SAR, progress has been made in reducing uncertainty,
particularly with respect to distinguishing and quantifying the magnitude of responses
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about the overall mechanisms of global climate change, scientists are
10
still debating the potential effects of this temperature increase.
These effects may include rising sea levels, melting polar ice caps and
glaciers, migrating malaria and dengue zones, and changing
agricultural productivity.11 Yet the cost of shifting the world economy
away from its reliance on fossil fuels hinders efforts to combat these
effects of climate change.
Whether the United States should share in incurring these
significant economic costs to avoid the potentially catastrophic harm
caused by global climate change is a policy question. However, if
national policymakers decide that reducing GHG emissions is
necessary, several legal tools may be used to achieve such a reduction.
One option is to join global agreement similar in objective to the
Kyoto Protocol. Another option is unilateral reduction of domestic
emissions. This domestic mandate could come in the form of either a
new federal statute or administrative action pursuant to an existing
statute. This Note considers the legal propriety of such administrative
to different external influences. Although many of the sources of uncertainty
identified in the SAR still remain to some degree, new evidence and improved
understanding support an updated conclusion.
....
In the light of new evidence and taking into account the remaining uncertainties,
most of the observed warming over the last 50 years is likely to have been due to the
increase in greenhouse gas concentrations.
Furthermore, it is very likely that the 20th century warming has contributed
significantly to the observed sea level rise, through thermal expansion of sea water
and widespread loss of land ice. Within present uncertainties, observations and
models are both consistent with a lack of significant acceleration of sea level rise
during the 20th century.
Id. at 10 (footnotes omitted); see also John Carey, Global Warming, BUS. WK., Aug. 16, 2004, at
60:
[T]he growing consensus among scientists and governments is that we can—and
must—do something. Researchers under the auspices of the National Academy of
Sciences and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have pondered
the evidence and concluded that the earth is warming, that humans are probably the
cause, and that the threat is real enough to warrant an immediate response.
10. See, e.g., James V. Titus & Vijay Narayanan, The Risk of Sea Level Rise: A Delphic
Monte Carlo Analysis in Which Twenty Researchers Specify Subjective Probability Distributions
for Model Coefficients Within Their Respective Areas of Expertise, 33 CLIMATIC CHANGE 151
(1996) (incorporating scientific estimates from a range of researchers into a study predicting the
probability of sea level rise), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/OAR/globalwarming.nsf/
UniqueKeyLookup/SHSU5BVPGF/$File/risk_of_rise.pdf.
11. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001:
SYNTHESIS REPORT: SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS 9–12 & n.3 (R. T. Watson et al. eds.,
2001) (listing “regional and global climatic, environmental, and socio-economic
consequences . . . associated with a range of greenhouse gas emissions”), available at
http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/vol4/english/index.htm.
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action, examining whether the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) currently has the authority to regulate GHGs, and CO2 in
particular, under the Clean Air Act (CAA).12
The question of whether the EPA has the authority to regulate
CO2 is anything but hypothetical. It received serious attention in 1998
when the Clinton administration left “a ticking time bomb hidden
13
away at the Environmental Protection Agency” in the form of a
statement by then Administrator Carol Browner that CO2 is an air
14
pollutant under the CAA and is subject to regulation. A legal
opinion, written by EPA General Counsel Jonathan Z. Cannon,
followed soon thereafter and outlined the legal basis for
Administrator Browner’s statement.15 Environmental groups
responded by petitioning the EPA to regulate CO2, and, after suits by
environmental groups and a change in presidential administrations,
16
the EPA issued a final decision denying the petition. This decision
was supported by a legal opinion prepared by then EPA General
Counsel Robert E. Fabricant.17 Although the initial lawsuits were
mooted, voluntarily dismissed, or possibly settled after the final
decision, several states, environmental organizations, and
municipalities filed petitions for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals
18
for the D.C. Circuit. In addition, each petitioner filed a separate

12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2000). Although a myriad of compounds are suspected of
contributing to the greenhouse effect, this Note focuses on CO2, which is the single most emitted
GHG and is the most common GHG in the atmosphere. However, the analysis applies equally
well to other GHGs.
13. Peter Glaser, “Greenhouse Gas” Debate Enters the Courthouse, ANDREWS ENVTL.
LITIG. REP., Dec. 5, 2003, at 11.
14. Departments of Housing and Urban Development and Independent Agencies
Appropriations for 1999: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations,
105th Cong. 199–200 (1998) (testimony of Carol Browner, Administrator, United States
Environmental Protection Agency).
15. Memorandum from Jonathan Z. Cannon, EPA General Counsel, to Carol M. Browner,
EPA Administrator (Apr. 10, 1998) [hereinafter Cannon Memorandum] (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
16. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922,
52,933 (Sept. 8, 2003).
17. Memorandum from Robert E. Fabricant, EPA General Counsel, to Marianne L.
Horinko, Acting EPA Administrator, at http://www.epa.gov/airlinks/co2petitiongcmemo828.pdf (Aug. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Fabricant Memorandum] (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
18. Glaser, supra note 13. Under section 307(b) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (2000),
the Court of Appeals for the D.C Circuit has jurisdiction to review “nationally applicable
regulations promulgated, or final action taken, by the Administrator.” Id.
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19
petition challenging the Fabricant legal opinion. A key question in
this legal battle will be whether the EPA has the authority to regulate
CO2 under the CAA.
This Note does not address directly the merits of the current
petitions to compel regulation of CO2. Rather, it analyzes the
preliminary question of whether or not the EPA has the legal
authority to regulate CO2 under the CAA. After examining both sides
of the legal debate, this Note argues that the EPA does have the
authority to regulate CO2. This authority is clear because the CAA is
a broad, constitutional grant of authority to regulate air pollutants
and because an agency determination that the CAA is applicable to
CO2 would be entitled to deference if supported by agency findings
on the record.20 This Note argues that the Fabricant Memorandum’s
heavy reliance on FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.21 to
support the contrary conclusion is misguided. The Brown &
Williamson Court held that Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
regulation of tobacco under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA) was inappropriate because such regulation contravened
the “unambiguously expressed intent of Congress,”22 and because a
separate and comprehensive regulatory scheme had been established
23
for tobacco. Because neither of these key factors is present in the
case of CO2, Brown & Williamson is inapposite. Neither the sparse
and ambiguous legislative history nor Congress’s limited subsequent
legislative action is enough to overcome the CAA’s clear language
authorizing the EPA to identify and regulate air pollutants, including
CO2.
This Note discusses the validity of the EPA’s authority to
regulate CO2 in three Parts.24 Part I briefly introduces the CAA

19. Glaser, supra note 13.
20. For a recent and similar analysis of the Cannon and Fabricant Memoranda, as well as a
discussion of the level of deference with which courts ought to treat the Fabricant
Memorandum, see generally Nicholle Winters, Note, Carbon Dioxide: A Pollutant in the Air,
But Is the EPA Correct That It Is Not an “Air Pollutant”?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1996 (2004).
21. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
22. Id. at 125–26 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843 (1984)).
23. Id. at 126.
24. In discussing the legal authority of the EPA to regulate CO2, this Note focuses on the
legal issue rather than the complex policy dynamics. Furthermore, it assumes that to support a
CO2 rule, the EPA would be able to generate a sufficient administrative record demonstrating
that CO2 is a threat to human welfare. This assumption is by no means trivial:
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before describing the arguments of two conflicting General Counsel
opinions. Part II analyzes whether CO2 is an air pollutant as defined
by the CAA in light of the appropriate level of deference that, under
25
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the
courts would give such a determination. Part II argues that the courts
likely would uphold an EPA rule regulating CO2 that was supported
by a sufficient factual record. Part III assesses, and rejects, the
primary argument of the Fabricant Memorandum—that Brown &
Williamson precludes the EPA from promulgating a CO2 rule.
I. INTRODUCING THE LEGAL DEBATE OVER CARBON DIOXIDE
Before addressing the EPA’s authority to regulate CO2 under the
CAA, some background information is necessary. Section A provides
a primer on the CAA and outlines the provisions pertinent to the
Note’s analysis. Section B discusses in turn each of the EPA General
Counsel Memoranda. It first outlines the Cannon Memorandum,
which argues that the EPA has the authority to regulate CO2, then
briefly recites the Fabricant Memorandum, which concludes that the
Supreme Court’s decision in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp.26 precludes the EPA from regulating CO2.
A. The Clean Air Act
The modern CAA was enacted in 197027 and was substantially
28
29
amended in 1977 and 1990. It “establishes a framework for the

Whenever an agency issues a regulation designed to diminish risks to health, safety,
or the environment, it should attempt to identify the gains sought by the particular
regulation it has chosen, and it should compare these gains to those under at least two
reasonable alternative regimes, one stricter and one more lenient. In this light, the
most serious problem with EPA’s performance in issuing national air quality
standards is that it usually fails to explain, in simple, concise terms, its decision to
require a particular level of ambient air quality.
Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 379 (1999).
25. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
26. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
27. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Theodore L. Garrett & Sonya D. Winner, A Clean
Air Act Primer: Part I, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,159, 10,161 (1992). For a
comprehensive history of the Clean Air Act, from original passage through its most recent
amendment, see generally id. at 10,159–65.
28. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
29. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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attainment and maintenance of air quality standards” and “sets
emission standards for motor vehicles and fuels, regulates hazardous
air pollutants, protects stratospheric ozone, and deals with acid
30
rain.” Most importantly for purposes of this Note, the Act delegates
to the EPA the authority to regulate the emission of air pollutants,
which section 302(g) of the Act defines as any “physical, chemical,
biological, radioactive . . . substance or matter which is emitted into or
otherwise enters the ambient air.”31 With the exception of certain
hazardous air pollutants, several of which are specifically enumerated
32
in section 112, the Act does not mandate that the EPA regulate any
specific compound or class of chemicals. Rather, Congress delegated
to the EPA the authority to determine which substances pose a threat
to public health, welfare, or the environment.33
If the EPA determines that an air pollutant poses a threat, it
must set primary and secondary air quality standards, known as

30. Garrett & Winner, supra note 27, at 10,161.
31. Clean Air Act § 302(g), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2000).
32. Id. § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412.
33. See id. § 108(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1):
For the purpose of establishing national primary and secondary ambient air quality
standards, the Administrator shall . . . publish, and shall from time to time thereafter
revise, a list which includes each air pollutant—(A) emissions of which, in his
judgment, cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare . . . .
Id. § 109(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(2) (“With respect to any air pollutant for which air quality
criteria are issued . . . the Administrator shall publish, simultaneously with the issuance of such
criteria and information, proposed national primary and secondary ambient air quality
standards for any such pollutant.”); id. § 111(b)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A) (“The
Administrator shall . . . publish . . . a list of categories of stationary sources. He shall include a
category of sources in such list if in his judgment it causes, or contributes significantly to, air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”); id.
§ 111(b)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(B) (“[T]he Administrator shall publish proposed
regulations, establishing Federal standards of performance for new sources within such
category.”); id. § 112(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(2) (“The Administrator shall periodically
review the list established by this subsection and . . . where appropriate, revise such list by rule,
adding pollutants which present, or may present, through inhalation or other routes of exposure,
a threat of adverse human health effects . . . or adverse environmental effects . . . .”); id.
§ 202(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1):
The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe . . . standards applicable to the
emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new
motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.
Id. § 231(a)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7571(a)(2)(A) (“The Administrator shall . . . issue proposed
emission standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of
aircraft engines which in his judgment causes, or contributes to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”).
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34
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), for each air
35
pollutant under section 108. If the concentration of any air pollutant
in an area exceeds the NAAQS, the area may be designated a
36
nonattainment area with respect to that pollutant. The state,
municipality, or regional air pollution control authority is then
required to take steps to reduce the emission of the air pollutant that
exceeds the standard.37 NAAQS have been established for particulate
matter,38 ozone,39 carbon monoxide,40 nitrogen dioxide,41 sulfur
dioxide,42 and lead.43 In addition, section 111 of the CAA authorizes
the EPA to regulate stationary sources of air pollution, such as power
44
plants. Finally, section 202 of the Act authorizes the EPA to
promulgate regulations to limit emissions from motor vehicles.45
One of the most important roles for the EPA in administering
the CAA is the setting of standards.46 Whether the EPA has the
authority to set national standards for CO2 is the focus of both the
Cannon and Fabricant Memoranda. The answer turns on whether
CO2 fits the definition of an “air pollutant” under section 302(g) of

34. See, e.g., National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg.
38,652 (July 18, 1997) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 50.6 (2003)).
35. Id. § 108, 42 U.S.C. § 7408.
36. See § 107(d)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1)(A) (requiring states to designate as
“nonattainment” those areas within their territory that do not meet the national or secondary
ambient air quality standards for a given pollutant).
37. Id. § 174, 42 U.S.C. § 7504.
38. 40 C.F.R. § 50.6 (2003).
39. The history of the NAAQS for ozone is more complex than that of other pollutants,
because the Supreme Court found the EPA’s attempt to revise the original standards unlawful.
See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 486 (2001). The EPA recently promulgated
a revised rule in an attempt to address the Court’s concerns. See Final Rule to Implement the 8Hour Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standard—Phase 1, 69 Fed. Reg. 23,951, 23,956–57
(Apr. 30, 2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 51, and 80).
40. 40 C.F.R. § 50.8.
41. Id. § 50.11.
42. Id. § 50.4.
43. Id. § 50.12.
44. Clean Air Act § 111(b)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(B) (2000).
45. Id. § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 7521; see also id. § 302(g), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (defining “air
pollutant”).
46. The EPA delegates most primary enforcement authority to state and local
governments. Under the CAA, the federal government is involved primarily in setting standards
and coordinating nationwide initiatives and normally takes over state or local air pollution
programs only if there is a significant history of noncompliance. See id. § 113(a)(2), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413(a)(2) (permitting federal action when “the Administrator finds . . . violations appear[ing]
to result from a failure of the State”).
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47
48
the Act. The section 302(g) definition is broad, and at least one
49
commentator has asserted that it is ambiguous. Despite its breadth
and ambiguity, the definition has remained virtually unmodified since
50
it was originally passed in 1977, with the exception of an addition
when Congress enacted the 1990 CAA Amendments.51

B. The Conflicting Approaches of the Cannon and Fabricant
Memoranda
Although the CAA definition of “air pollutant” appears facially
broad, the Cannon Memorandum and the Fabricant Memorandum
disagree as to whether CO2 fits within the definition. The Cannon
Memorandum concludes that, based on a straightforward reading of
section 302(g), CO2 is an “air pollutant” and thus subject to EPA
regulation.52 According to the Fabricant Memorandum, however, CO2
is not an air pollutant. The Fabricant Memorandum relies on Brown
& Williamson to argue—somewhat circularly—that because Brown &
Williamson precludes the EPA from regulating CO2, by extension
53
CO2 is neither an “air pollution agent” nor an “air pollutant.”
1. The Cannon Memorandum. The Cannon Memorandum
employs a two-step approach to argue that CO2 is an air pollutant and
thus that EPA regulation is permissible. In the first step, it analyzes
whether CO2 is an “air pollutant” under section 302(g) of the Act.54 It
concludes that CO2 facially meets this definition because CO2 is a
chemical substance emitted into the ambient air, mainly as the
product of combustion. That CO2 naturally occurs in the ambient air
does not preclude regulation, because “many of the pollutants that
47. See id. § 302(g), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g); supra note 31 and accompanying text.
48. Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 353 n.60 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
49. See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Global Warming, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,253,
10,257 (2001) (“The § 302(g) definition of pollutant is broad and ambiguous.” (footnote
omitted)).
50. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 301(c), 91 Stat. 685, 770
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2000)).
51. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 108(j)(2), 104 Stat. 2399,
2468 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2000)) (“Such . . . term includes any
precursors to the formation of any air pollutant, to the extent the Administrator has identified
such precursor or precursors for the particular purpose for which the term ‘air pollutant’ is
used.”).
52. Cannon Memorandum, supra note 15, pt. II.A.
53. Fabricant Memorandum, supra note 17, at 10.
54. See Clean Air Act § 302(g), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2000); see also supra note 31 and
accompanying text.
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EPA currently regulates are naturally present in the air in some
quantity and are emitted from natural as well as anthropogenic
55
sources.”
After determining that CO2 generally is an “air pollutant,” the
Memorandum proceeds to the second step of its analysis, examining
whether CO2 “meets the specific criteria for EPA action under a
particular provision of the Act.”56 Although the Memorandum does
not analyze CO2 under any specific section of the CAA,57 it notes that
many specific sections “share a common feature in that the exercise of
EPA’s authority to regulate air pollutants is linked to a determination
by the Administrator regarding the air pollutants’ actual or potential
58
harmful effects on public health, welfare or the environment.” The
CAA’s broad definition of welfare, section 302(h), states:
[A]ll language referring to effects on welfare includes, but is not
limited to, effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, manmade
materials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and climate, damage
to and deterioration of property, and hazards to transportation, as
well as effects on economic values and on personal comfort and
well-being, whether caused by transformation, conversion, or
59
combination with other air pollutants.

55. Cannon Memorandum, supra note 15, pt. II.A.
56. Id. pt. II.B.
57. Although the Cannon Memorandum does not analyze possible CO2 regulation under
any specific provision of the Act, it does analyze whether the EPA could establish a marketbased, cap-and-trade program. It concludes that the potentially applicable provisions of the
CAA would not support the cap-and-trade program sought by President Clinton. Id. pt. II.C.
These provisions relate either to state pollution control programs or to national technologybased regulation of stationary sources. Id. Concerning state programs, the Cannon
Memorandum argues that the EPA may require that states regulate specific pollutants but that
the “EPA cannot mandate specific emission control measures for states to use in meeting the
general provisions for attaining ambient air quality standards.” Id. EPA authority to impose a
cap-and-trade program on the states would operate only “[u]nder certain limited circumstances
where states fail[ed] to carry out their responsibilities under Title I of the Clean Air Act.” Id.
Concerning a cap-and-trade program on stationary sources, the Cannon Memorandum notes
that the EPA has interpreted sections 111 and 112 of the Act as not allowing for “compliance
through intersource . . . cap-and-trade approaches.” Id. The EPA broadly defined the term
“stationary source” to include single facilities with multiple individual pollution-emitting
devices.” See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840, 866
(1984) (upholding this definition). Although this definition allows for intrasource trading, it
does not permit intersource trading across plant boundaries. Cannon Memorandum, supra note
15, pt. II.C.
58. Cannon Memorandum, supra note 15, pt. II.B.
59. § 302(h), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h) (emphasis added).
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Because the definition of “welfare” references “climate,” regulation
of CO2 would be appropriate under any section of the Act that
mandates action to protect welfare. The Cannon Memorandum
concludes that “[w]hile CO2, as an air pollutant, is within EPA’s scope
of authority to regulate, the Administrator has [not] yet determined
that CO2 meets the criteria for regulation under one or more
60
provisions of the Act.” Thus, EPA regulation of CO2 is conceptually
possible, yet not required, under the approach of the Cannon
Memorandum.
2. The Fabricant Memorandum. Because the Fabricant
Memorandum was written in part in response to the Cannon
Memorandum and in part to support a final decision denying a
petition to regulate CO2, the Memorandum is more comprehensive
than the Cannon Memorandum, though it nonetheless is easily
summarized. The Fabricant Memorandum relies heavily on Brown &
Williamson, arguing that because of the CAA’s “purpose, structure
and history and other relevant congressional actions,”61 coupled with
62
the potential economic significance of regulation, the CAA does not
authorize the EPA to regulate CO2.
As a preliminary matter, the Memorandum notes that several
provisions of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 specifically
“touch on matters related to global climate change,” but that none of
these provisions authorizes regulation and that two “expressly
63
preclude their use for authorizing regulation.” Fabricant further
notes that, at the time of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,
Congress was well aware of the problem of global climate change, as
evidenced by the development of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which was signed by the
President and approved by the Senate in 1992.64
The Fabricant Memorandum then proceeds with an analysis
under Brown & Williamson, positing a number of arguments. First, it
60. Cannon Memorandum, supra note 15, pt. II.B.
61. Fabricant Memorandum, supra note 17, at 9.
62. Id. at 8–9.
63. Id. at 5; see also Clean Air Act § 103(g), 42 U.S.C. § 7403(g) (mandating that the
administrator conduct research into nonregulatory solutions, and that “[s]uch program . . .
include . . . [i]mprovements in nonregulatory strategies and technologies for preventing or
reducing multiple air pollutants, including . . . carbon dioxide”); id. § 602(e), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7671a(e) (“[T]he Administrator shall publish the global warming potential of each listed
[ozone-depleting] substance.”).
64. Fabricant Memorandum, supra note 17, at 5.
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contends that regulating CO2 under the CAA is logically inconsistent
with the structure and purpose of the Act.65 Second, it explains that
Congress has taken subsequent “actions consistent with the view that
Congress did not authorize CAA regulation for global climate change
purposes.”66 Finally, the Memorandum argues that it is unreasonable
to conclude that Congress intended for the CAA, a general act, to
67
authorize so significant an action as regulation of CO2. The
Fabricant Memorandum concludes that Brown & Williamson
precludes the EPA from regulating CO2 and that the agency properly
68
awaits additional instruction on the issue from Congress.
II. CO2 AS AN AIR POLLUTANT UNDER THE CLEAN
AIR ACT—A CHEVRON ANALYSIS
A foundational, though implicit, assumption of the Cannon
Memorandum is that if the EPA promulgated a rule regulating CO2,
that rule would be entitled to deference. That is, the legal authority
that the Cannon Memorandum claims for the EPA would be
meaningless unless upheld in court, because it is certain that any rule
would be challenged within moments of promulgation. Assuming a
sufficient factual record to support a CO2 rule,69 the starting point for
an analysis of what level of deference courts owe to the EPA
interpretation of the CAA is Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.70 A Chevron analysis proceeds in two
parts:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which
it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is
the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the
court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own

65. Id. at 6–7.
66. Id. at 8.
67. See id. at 10 (“In view of the unusually profound implications of global climate change
regulation, it is unreasonable to believe that Congress intended ‘to delegate a decision of
such . . . significance . . . in so cryptic a fashion.’” (omissions in original) (quoting FDA v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)).
68. Id.
69. See infra notes 106–11 and accompanying text.
70. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of
an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
71
construction of the statute.

Under the two-step Chevron analysis, a reviewing court should
uphold a hypothetical CO2 rule that the EPA supported with
sufficient findings. Applying Chevron to CO2, Section A posits that
the CAA directly addresses the EPA’s authority to regulate CO2.
Based on an analysis of the text of the CAA, it is clear that CO2 fits
within the statutory definition of the term “air pollutant” and thus is
subject to regulation. However, some commentators have argued that
the CAA is ambiguous regarding CO2.72 If a reviewing court were to
agree, it would proceed to the second step of Chevron and analyze
the reasonableness of the EPA’s construction of the CAA. Section B
considers how such an analysis might proceed. This Part does not
consider the possible effect of Brown & Williamson—a topic reserved
for Part III. Whether under step one or step two of Chevron, courts
should grant deference to and consequently uphold an EPA rule
regulating CO2.
A. Chevron Step One: Has Congress Spoken to the Direct Question
at Issue?
As discussed above, CO2 facially meets the definition of an air
73
pollutant under section 302. Although this should end the matter,
some courts have used legislative history to conclude that a statute is
74
ambiguous. The 1970 CAA was unaccompanied by legislative
history relevant to GHGs.75 The first meaningful legislative history

71. Id. at 842–43 (footnotes omitted).
72. Reitze, supra note 49, at 10,257.
73. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 43 (1990) (White, J., dissenting)
(“The Court’s opinion today requires more than 10 pages, including a review of numerous
statutory provisions and legislative history, to conclude that the Paperwork Reduction Act of
1980 . . . is clear and unambiguous . . . .”).
75. It is difficult to prove this negative assertion, but, notably, neither the Cannon
Memorandum nor the Fabricant Memorandum cites legislative history generated in 1970. The
Fabricant Memorandum finds support instead in the legislative history accompanying the later
amendments. See Fabricant Memorandum, supra note 17, at 6 (examining the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 and noting that “section 103(g) was revised in conference to include the
term ‘nonregulatory’ to describe the ‘strategies and technologies’ the subsection was intended to
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directly relevant to CO2 appeared with the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990. While considering the Amendments, the
Senate considered and rejected language regulating GHG emissions
from motor vehicle tailpipes.76 Furthermore, when the House and
Senate versions of the stratospheric ozone provisions were
consolidated, references to CO2 originally present in the Senate
77
version were deleted. Professor Reitze argues that “[t]his is strong
evidence the Congress did not intend to regulate [GHGs],”78 and that
“[a] basic rule of statutory construction is that silence by Congress
after considering a proposal cannot be the basis for claiming Congress
[sic] authorization.”79 Although Professor Reitze’s observations
indicate that Congress did not intend to provide explicit authorization
to the EPA to regulate CO2 when it amended the CAA in 1990, one
can conclude just as easily that Congress did not intend to affect the
EPA’s authority at all.80 In fact, the legislative history demonstrates
that the 101st Congress was concerned with global climate change:
[B]y the time there is scientific proof for every detail of the problem,
it will be too late to avoid the most devastating impacts of an
intensified greenhouse effect and global climate change. We can illafford to wait for 5 or 10 years of research before we take action to
(1) limit the rate and extent of future climate change by reducing
atmospheric emissions and concentrations of greenhouse gases, and
(2) implement adaptation strategies for coping with the changes to
81
which we are already committed.

promote, and that this point was underscored in the conference report” (citing H.R. CONF. REP.
NO. 101-952, at 349 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3867, 3881)).
76. Reitze, supra note 49, at 10,257.
77. Id. at 10,258. Professor Reitze notes that the sole exception is a reference to GHGs in
section 602(e), which specifies that “the Administrator shall publish the global warming
potential of each listed [ozone-depleting] substance, and that this provision “shall not be
construed to be the basis of any additional regulation under this chapter.” Id. (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Clean Air Act § 602(e), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7671a(e) (2000)).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Cf. Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 170
(2001) (“A bill can be proposed for any number of reasons, and it can be rejected for just as
many others.”); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 163 (2000) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (“The inferences that the majority draws from later legislative history are not
persuasive, since . . . one can just as easily infer from the later laws that Congress did not intend
to affect the FDA’s tobacco-related authority at all.”).
81. S. REP. NO. 101–228, at 379–80 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3762–63.
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The legislative history contains no mention of an intention to limit the
EPA’s authority to combat the causes of global climate change; quite
the contrary, the legislative history directs the EPA to preempt a
82
growing social and environmental problem.
As Judge Leventhal once said, using legislative history is like
83
“looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.” Although
Professor Reitze points to legislative history favoring his position,
other language supports the proposition that Congress intended for
the EPA to define air pollutants broadly. Specifically, when directing
the EPA to regulate radioactive pollutants, arsenic, cadmium, and
polycyclic organic matter in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,
Congress noted:
[T]here are numerous other air pollutants which to date have not
been subject to regulations under the Clean Air Act. Despite
mounting evidence that these pollutants are associated with serious
health hazards and despite recommendations from prestigious
medical and scientific bodies, the Agency has failed to promulgate
regulations to institute adequate control measures for these
84
unregulated pollutants.

The legislative history of the CAA supports either argument, but it
certainly does not demonstrate a clear intent by Congress, whether in
1990, 1977, or 1970, to preclude the EPA from regulating CO2.
Although legislative history has its place, even its advocates
acknowledge that it should be used with care and primarily in cases
involving ambiguous statutes.85 Here, there is no indication that the
CAA’s definition of “air pollutant” is ambiguous, and, in fact,
Congress was clear that increasing the universe of regulated air
pollutants should be a goal of the EPA.86
82. Id. at 380 (“Failure to act on the greenhouse effect on the basis of current scientific
understanding would replicate the mistake made in the early 1980’s with respect to destruction
of the ozone layer.”).
83. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (quoting Judge Leventhal).
84. H.R. REP. NO. 95–294, at 36 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1114. The
report further stated, “Nor does this section affect EPA’s authority or duty to regulate any other
presently unregulated air pollutant besides the four named pollutants.” Id. at 41.
85. Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L.
REV. 845, 847 (1991) (defending the use of legislative history in “cases in which statutory
language is unclear (for few other cases raise serious problems on appeal)”).
86. H.R. REP. NO. 95–294, at 2 (stating that one of the goals of the 1977 amendments was
“to create incentives for the regulation of currently unregulated pollutants and unregulated
sources of pollution”).
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To discard the statutory definition of “air pollutant” in favor of a
definition that would exclude GHGs based on ambiguous legislative
history would be unwarranted. Statutes that authorize regulation of
health and safety matters, such as the CAA, “quite routinely contain
broad language authorizing agencies to regulate articles or substances
if the statutory criteria are met.”87 Furthermore, to override the broad
statutory definition would require reliance on legislative history
generated not in 1970, when the modern CAA was passed, but in
1977 and 1990, when the CAA was amended. The use of subsequent
88
legislative history has been vehemently criticized and, “even when it
would otherwise be useful, subsequent legislative history will rarely
override a reasonable interpretation of a statute.”89 Here, the
subsequent legislative history available does not prove congressional
intent with the clarity necessary to preclude the EPA from regulating
CO2.
B. Chevron Step Two: Would It Be Reasonable for the EPA to
Determine That It Has the Authority to Regulate CO2?
If a reviewing court found that the CAA is ambiguous
concerning the EPA’s authority to regulate CO2, the second step of
Chevron would require that a court uphold the agency rule, if “based

87. Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law Courts,
47 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1031 (1998). Professor Sunstein uses the example of the EPA’s regulation of
the pesticide DDT under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7
U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (1994):
[I]t is generally agreed that . . . FIFRA authorizes the EPA to regulate DDT as a
product raising “a substantial question” of human safety, but that this authority does
not rest on a judgment that the Congress that enacted FIFRA believed that the EPA
could regulate DDT. On the contrary, when introduced, DDT was thought to be
unproblematic and entirely safe and hence the enacting Congress did not contemplate
that FIFRA would authorize EPA regulation of DDT. The EPA nevertheless
possesses just such authority. . . . Whether Congress believed that the statutory
criteria were met when it enacted the relevant legislation is beside the point unless
Congress embodied that belief in law. . . . As the Court wrote in [Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998)], “statutory prohibitions often go
beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the
provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which
we are governed.”
Id. at 1030–31 (citations omitted).
88. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 632 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part)
(“Arguments based on subsequent legislative history, like arguments based on antecedent
futurity, should not be taken seriously, not even in a footnote.”).
89. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 (1980)
(refusing to give deferential treatment to subsequent administrative interpretations of the
Consumer Product Safety Act).
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90
on a permissible construction of the statute.” That is, even if a
reviewing court were tempted to rely on legislative history to
conclude that the CAA is ambiguous with respect to CO2, the EPA’s
91
determination would be entitled to deference. The question of what
level of deference applies to which sorts of agency actions is complex,
especially in the aftermath of Chevron.92 This analysis involves two
inquiries: (1) would a CO2 rule issued under the CAA be a legislative
rule or an interpretive rule; and (2) what level of deference, if any,
applies? Because an EPA rule subjecting CO2 to CAA coverage
would be a legislative rule, a determination that the CAA applies to
CO2 likely would be treated with deference and upheld by a reviewing
court.
Whether a hypothetical CO2 rule would be legislative or
interpretive is important because legislative rules receive deference
93
94
under Chevron, whereas interpretive rules receive less deference.
“[O]nly legislative rules are adopted pursuant to a specific delegation
of rulemaking authority,”95 and interpretive rules “merely state[] the
96
agency’s view of what the statute already requires.” Professor Herz
notes that EPA rules establishing NAAQS for certain air pollutants
“are legislative rules by any definition; they create binding legal
duties where none . . . existed before and are promulgated pursuant
to express congressional delegation.”97 A proposed CO2 rule
promulgated under the EPA’s CAA authority and subject to notice

90. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
91. For a general discussion of the rationale behind reviewing courts’ granting deference,
see Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J.
511.
92. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 2071 (1990) (suggesting that Chevron deference should not extend to agency
interpretations in the absence of congressional delegation of lawmaking authority and noting
the uncertain relationship between Chevron deference and other well-established principles of
statutory interpretation). For an empirical study on Chevron’s impact on reviewing courts, see
Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal
Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984.
93. Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking
Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187, 193 (1992).
94. Id. at 192–93 (citing Frank Diehl Farms v. Sec’y of Labor, 696 F.2d 1325, 1329 (11th
Cir. 1983)).
95. Id. at 192.
96. Id. at 191–92.
97. Id. at 200.
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and comment rulemaking would be a legislative rule and thus entitled
98
to Chevron deference.
Although classification of a proposed CO2 rule as a legislative
rule should ensure that the EPA interpretation would receive
deference, some scholars suggest that Chevron essentially eliminated
99
the distinction between legislative and interpretive rules. Whether
Chevron replaced the distinction between legislative and interpretive
rules with a “uniform principal of deference,”100 or was intended
101
“simply as a straightforward application of settled principles,” is
outside the scope of this Note.102 What matters here is that, whether
analyzed under Chevron or under the historical approach exemplified
103
by NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., a hypothetical CO2 rule

98. While a formal CO2 rule would be entitled to deference, the interpretive memoranda
issued by Cannon and Fabricant are not. When an agency issues an interpretation or opinion
not based on adversary proceedings, notice and comment rulemaking, or an otherwise
authoritative decision of an agency head, then Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944), rather
than Chevron, applies. In Skidmore, the Court considered “that the rulings, interpretations and
opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of
their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance.” Id. at 140. This reasoning comports with Christensen
v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000):
[W]e confront an interpretation contained in an opinion letter, not one arrived at
after, for example, a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Interpretations such as those in opinion letters—like interpretations contained in
policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the
force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference.
Id. at 587. Furthermore, in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), the Court declined
to extend Chevron deference to a tariff classification ruling issued by the U.S. Customs Service.
Id. at 221.
99. See, e.g., Cooley R. Howarth, Jr., United States v. Mead Corp.: More Pieces for the
Chevron/Skidmore Deference Puzzle, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 699, 700–01 (2002) (“[T]he rhetoric, if
not the result, in Chevron . . . [was] that . . . in the presence of statutory ambiguity or silence,
courts should defer to any reasonable agency ‘interpretation’ of its empowering statute.”).
Professor Howarth notes, however, that, “[t]he Court’s post-Chevron deference cases have
created qualifications and exceptions to the Chevron doctrine, and some of those have hinted
that the interpretation/lawmaking distinction was relevant to the decision of whether to defer to
an agency ‘interpretation.’” Id. at 701 (footnotes omitted).
100. GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 579 (3d ed. 2001).
101. Id.
102. However, Professor Lawson observes that “[t]here is little doubt that the Court in 1984
intended this second, or weak, reading of Chevron.” Id.
103. 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944), overruled in part on other grounds by Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992) (“[W]here the question is one of specific application of a
broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must
determine it initially, the reviewing court’s function is limited.”).

BAIRD FINAL.DOC

2004]

EPA REGULATION OF CARBON DIOXIDE

2/25/2005 2:30 PM

165

104
would receive deference as long as it was reasonable. That is, even
under a weaker reading of Chevron, “whenever an agency is
entrusted with implementing power—whether to be exercised
through rulemaking or adjudication—agency interpretations in the
course of exercising that power are entitled to respect so long as they
are reasonable.”105
In reviewing an EPA interpretation of the CAA that purported
to justify a CO2 rule, a court would scrutinize the administrative
106
record. If the EPA demonstrated that CO2 had an effect on climate,
regulation could fall under any of the provisions of the CAA that
authorize regulation to protect “welfare,” as discussed in the Cannon
Memorandum.107 Although it is impossible to speculate on the type of
record that the EPA could generate linking CO2 to impacts on
climate, recent CAA cases suggest that a CO2 rule would be upheld.
108
Lead Industries Ass’n v. EPA is particularly instructive. In that case,
the court upheld NAAQS for lead that “were the culmination of a
process of rigorous scientific and public review which permitted a
thorough ventilation of the complex scientific and technical issues

104. This analysis hinges upon the administrator supporting a decision to regulate CO2 with
evidence in the administrative record sufficient to lead a reviewing court to conclude that the
decision was reasonable. This task would not be a trivial matter by any stretch of the
imagination, and if the findings of the EPA did not present an “adequate basis and
explanation,” there would be little chance that a CO2 rule would be upheld. Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 34 (1983); see also supra note 24
(discussing the process by which an agency generates an administrative record to support a
proposed rule).
105. Sunstein, supra note 87, at 2093. Professor Sunstein also notes that
[i]f this is the basis for Chevron, the principle of deference does not extend to
interpretations by agencies that have not been granted the authority to interpret the
law. For example, agencies that have been entrusted with the power to prosecute
violations but not to make rules lack the pedigree that is a prerequisite for deference.
It follows that even if an agency has been given the power of interpretation through
rulemaking, it is not entitled to deference if it did not exercise rulemaking power in
the particular case. It follows even more clearly that mere litigating positions are not
entitled to deference. And if this is so, Chevron applies only when an agency is
exercising the power to make rules or otherwise carrying out legislatively delegated
interpretive authority.
Id. at 2093–94 (citations omitted).
106. Although it is certainly possible that the EPA would be unable to find sufficient
evidence to prove that CO2 contributes to global climate change, the growing scientific
consensus on the subject makes this possibility unlikely. See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying
text.
107. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text. It would be impossible to examine here
all the scenarios under which CO2 could be regulated, given the complexity of the CAA. Thus
this inquiry is limited to whether CO2 could qualify for regulation as a threshold manner. For a
brief discussion of the consistency of CO2 regulation with the CAA as a whole, see infra Part III.
108. 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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109
presented by this rulemaking proceeding.” Chevron itself was a
CAA case, which upheld the EPA’s broad application of the statutory
term “stationary source” to include all individual pollution-emitting
devices at the same facility.110 Some commentators suggest that
Chevron may be limited to situations similar to the facts of Chevron.111
Even so, applying the statutory term “air pollutant” to CO2 is similar
to, and perhaps even more logical than, applying the term “stationary
source” to multiple sources at the same facility.
Finally, CAA’s complexity and the science underlying a possible
EPA determination that CO2 affects climate indicate that a reviewing
court should defer to the EPA, because, “given the difficulties
associated with environmental regulation, and the problem of
devising workable, effective regulation, an inference that Congress
intended the courts to listen carefully to EPA’s broad interpretation
of the statute seems reasonable.”112 Because a proposed CO2 rule
would undergo rigorous scientific review,113 which would be assured
by the economic interests at stake,114 a reviewing court should defer to
the agency determination even if the court would have interpreted
115
the statute differently.

III. DID CHEVRON REALLY GO UP IN SMOKE WITH BROWN &
WILLIAMSON?
Although Chevron seems critical to understanding the EPA’s
authority to regulate CO2, neither the Cannon Memorandum nor the
Fabricant Memorandum specifically mentions the decision. The
Cannon Memorandum at least implicitly relies on Chevron: its

109. Id. at 1184.
110. 467 U.S. 837, 837 (1984).
111. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV.
363, 381 (1986).
112. Id. at 381–82.
113. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (explaining that EPA regulation of CO2
would require substantial support in the administrative record).
114. See infra Part III.B.3.
115. In a case involving the propriety of regulations issued by the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, the Supreme Court noted that,
[i]n a situation of this kind, Congress entrusts to the Secretary, rather than to the
courts, the primary responsibility for interpreting the statutory term. In exercising
that responsibility, the Secretary adopts regulations with legislative effect. A
reviewing court is not free to set aside those regulations simply because it would have
interpreted the statute in a different manner.
Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977).
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argument that the EPA has the legal authority to regulate reflects a
belief that a reviewing court would uphold the action. In contrast, the
Fabricant Memorandum ignored Chevron altogether, favoring
116
analysis under FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. In fact,
some commentators criticize the Brown & Williamson decision itself
for ignoring Chevron and refusing to defer appropriately to the
FDA.117 Section A analyzes the interplay between Brown &
Williamson and Chevron, concluding that Brown & Williamson did
not overrule Chevron but rather changed its scope. Section B
examines the Fabricant Memorandum’s reliance on Brown &
Williamson. Section B argues that the Fabricant Memorandum’s
reliance on Brown & Williamson is misplaced, because CO2 does not
fit within the relatively narrow confines that the Court established in
Brown & Williamson.
A. The Effect of Brown & Williamson on Chevron
In Brown & Williamson, the Supreme Court struck down FDA
regulation of tobacco products as “inconsistent with the intent that
Congress ha[d] expressed in the FDCA’s overall regulatory scheme
and in the tobacco-specific legislation that it ha[d] enacted
118
subsequent to the FDCA.” The Brown & Williamson decision
rested on three essential points. First, the Court found regulation of
tobacco under the FDCA logically inconsistent with the clearly
expressed intent of Congress.119 That is, a “fundamental precept” of
the Act was that a drug must be safe.120 The FDA’s conclusion that
tobacco products were unsafe would have “require[d] the FDA to

116. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
117. Michael Herz, Reading the Clean Air Act After Brown & Williamson, 31 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,151, 10,152 n.23 (2001). Professor Herz cites a number of articles written in
response to the Fourth Circuit decision in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153
F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1999), which the Supreme Court upheld. See Herz, supra, at 10,152 n.23; see
also Joseph A. Fazioli, Recent Case, Chevron Up in Smoke?: Tobacco at the Crossroads of
Administrative Law, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Food & Drug Administration, 153
F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1998), 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1057, 1058–59 (1999) (“The Supreme
Court, which recently granted certiorari to review Brown & Williamson, should take this
important opportunity to reaffirm the Chevron doctrine against the Fourth Circuit’s
aggrandizement of judicial power.” (footnote omitted)); Marguerite Sullivan, Brown &
Williamson v. FDA: Finding Congressional Intent Through Creative Statutory Interpretation—A
Departure from Chevron, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 273, 302–03 (1999).
118. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 126.
119. Id. at 142–43.
120. Id. at 142.
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121
remove them from the market entirely,” rather than simply regulate
their distribution. But banning tobacco would have “contradict[ed]
Congress’s clear intent as expressed in its more recent, tobaccospecific legislation.”122 Second, the Court considered it significant that
“Congress ha[d] enacted six separate pieces of legislation since 1965
addressing the problem of tobacco use and human health.”123 The
Court concluded:

Congress has affirmatively acted to address the issue of tobacco and
health, relying on the representations of the FDA that it had no
authority to regulate tobacco. It has created a distinct scheme to
regulate the sale of tobacco products, focused on labeling and
advertising, and premised on the belief that the FDA lacks such
124
jurisdiction under the FDCA.

Finally, the Court noted, almost as an afterthought, that
“Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such
economic and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a
125
fashion.” The Court was not entirely clear on what was cryptic
about the FDCA, instead reiterating that regulation of an
economically important industry such as tobacco under the FDCA
was invalid in light of the strained concept of “safety” and subsequent
tobacco-specific legislation.
Reflecting on Brown & Williamson, one might conclude that the
Court did not ignore Chevron—because both the majority and dissent
employed a Chevron step one analysis—but rather changed the scope
126
of Chevron. Professor Herz argues that Brown & Williamson
essentially clarified three questions raised by Chevron. First, Brown
& Williamson confirmed “that ambiguity itself can be an implicit
delegation of decisionmaking authority.”127 He further argues that, in
addition to the clarity of the statute, “Chevron deference hinges on a
policymaking delegation, and while the requisite delegation can
sometimes be found simply through Congress’s use of vague
language, such an implicit delegation will be found only for minor,

121. Id. at 143.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 156.
125. Id. at 160.
126. Herz, supra note 117, at 10,155.
127. Id.
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128
interstitial questions.” Finally, he argues that all nine Justices
“looked well beyond the language, plain or otherwise, of the
provision at issue.”129 These clarifying features of Brown &
Williamson do not fundamentally alter the Chevron analysis
described in Part II. In the case of air pollutants, it is clear that
Congress delegated to the EPA the authority to define and regulate
such pollutants; thus this is not a case of delegation through
ambiguity, but rather an explicit policymaking delegation.
Furthermore, even if a reviewing court were to look beyond the clear
language of section 302(g), the legislative history likely would not
furnish evidence that Congress intended to contravene this clear
language.130

B. The Fabricant Memorandum’s Flawed Reliance on Brown &
Williamson
As discussed in Part I, the CAA delegated to the EPA the
authority to determine which air pollutants should be regulated,131 and
on its face an EPA decision that CO2 is an air pollutant under section
302(g) would be consistent with the statutory definition.132 Therefore,
the significant question that the Fabricant Memorandum poses and
answers affirmatively is whether, despite the plain language of the
CAA, Brown & Williamson precludes the EPA from regulating CO2.
Brown & Williamson analyzed congressional intent under three broad
categories: the consistency of FDA jurisdiction over tobacco with the
statutory structure of the FDCA, the preclusive effect of subsequent
tobacco-specific legislation, and the importance of the policy decision
at issue.133
The following three Sections analyze each prong in turn. Section
1 argues that regulating CO2 is consistent with the statutory structure
and purpose of the CAA. Section 2 analyzes the effect of GHG-

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See supra Part II.A.
131. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
132. Although section 302 does not define the term “air pollution agent,” section 302(g)
states that “[t]he term ‘air pollutant’ means any air pollution agent or combination of such
agents, including any physical [or] chemical . . . substance . . . which is emitted into . . . the
ambient air.” Clean Air Act § 302(g), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2000) (emphasis added). That is, air
pollution agents include any physical and chemical substances emitted into the ambient air; CO2
is such a substance, and thus CO2 is logically an “air pollution agent.”
133. See supra notes 119–25 and accompanying text.
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specific legislation enacted after the CAA, arguing that subsequent
legislation does not establish a regulatory structure even marginally
comparable to the tobacco legislation at issue in Brown &
Williamson. Finally, Section 3 concludes that, because the EPA is
precluded from considering cost under many provisions of the CAA
and interpreting cases, potentially harmful economic consequences
caused by a hypothetical CO2 rule are irrelevant. In sum, there is no
clear congressional intent under the Brown & Williamson rubric that
could displace the EPA’s clear statutory authority to regulate CO2.
1. Is Regulating CO2 Logically Inconsistent with the Structure
and Purpose of the Clean Air Act? In applying the first prong of the
Brown & Williamson analysis, the Fabricant Memorandum argues
that regulating CO2 is logically inconsistent with the structure and
purpose of the CAA. The Fabricant Memorandum searches for
134
logical inconsistency under the stratospheric ozone provisions. It
argues that, because of the global nature of the CO2 issue, if Congress
had intended for the EPA to regulate CO2 it would have included
specific authorization when it enacted the stratospheric ozone
135
provisions. The argument, framed in terms of Brown & Williamson,
is that regulating one class of globally present compounds such as
GHGs without specific authorization is logically inconsistent with
Congress’s enactment of specific legislation addressing a completely
different class of globally present compounds (compounds that
deplete the ozone layer) in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.
However, as discussed in Part II.A, there could be many reasons that
Congress did not specifically authorize the EPA to regulate CO2 in
1990; consequently, one cannot conclude that Congress intended for
the stratospheric ozone provision to preclude EPA regulation of
CO2.136
The Fabricant Memorandum further seeks inconsistency in the
past practices of the EPA, arguing that the EPA’s focus on pollutants
of primarily local or regional concern precludes regulation of
134. See Fabricant Memorandum, supra note 17, at 6 (“The CAA provisions addressing
stratospheric ozone depletion demonstrate that Congress has understood the need for specially
tailored solutions to global atmospheric issues, and has expressly granted regulatory authority
when it has concluded that controls may be needed as part of those solutions.”).
135. See id. (suggesting that “it would be anomalous to conclude that Congress intended
EPA to address global climate change under the CAA’s general regulatory provisions, with no
provision recognizing the international dimension of the issue and any solution, and no express
authorization to regulate”).
136. See supra notes 76–82 and accompanying text.
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137
pollutants of global concern. However, the Brown & Williamson
majority clarified that its “conclusion [did] not rely on the fact that
the FDA’s assertion of jurisdiction [over tobacco] represent[ed] a
sharp break with its prior interpretation of the FDCA,” stating that
“an agency’s initial interpretation of a statute that it is charged with
administering is not ‘carved in stone.’”138 By the same token, the
EPA’s failure to regulate GHGs since initial passage of the CAA in
1970 should not preclude it from regulating CO2.
Perhaps the most powerful argument presented by the Fabricant
Memorandum, and supported by Professor Reitze, is that CO2 may
not be regulated under the CAA because the NAAQS system was
139
not designed to address pollutants such as CO2. The argument is
that regulation of CO2 under the general provisions of the CAA is
inconsistent with an underlying premise of the Act—“that actions
taken by individual states and by EPA can generally bring all areas of
the U.S. into attainment of a NAAQS.”140 CO2 has a long residence
time in the atmosphere (fifty to two hundred years) and is well
dispersed across the world. Furthermore “the potential for either
adverse or beneficial effects in the U.S. from these concentrations
depends on complicated interactions of many variables on the land, in
the oceans, and in the atmosphere, occurring around the world and
over long periods of time.”141
However, the history of the CAA and the NAAQS system in
particular cannot sustain the argument that the NAAQS system is
only appropriate for regulating air pollutants on a local scale. For
142
example, a NAAQS for particulate matter has long existed, despite

137. See Fabricant Memorandum, supra note 17, at 6 (arguing that the general regulatory
provisions of the CAA, such as section 109 (establishment of NAAQS), 42 U.S.C. § 7409,
“address air pollution problems that occur primarily at ground level or near the surface of the
earth”).
138. 529 U.S. 120, 156–57 (2000) (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Def. Res.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984)).
139. See Fabricant Memorandum, supra note 17, at 7 (arguing that CO2 is “unlike any
pollutant for which a NAAQS has been established, [and that a NAAQS for CO2] could not be
attained by any area of the U.S. until such a standard were attained by the entire world as a
result of emission controls implemented in countries around the world”); Reitze, supra note 49,
at 10,259–63 (“CO2, however, cannot be controlled effectively by the [State Implementation
Plan] process because ambient tropospheric levels are essentially the same everywhere in the
world. The United States contributes only about 22% of the world’s anthropogenic GHG
releases.” (footnote omitted)).
140. Fabricant Memorandum, supra note 17, at 7.
141. Id.
142. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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well-documented evidence of long-range dispersion of particulate
143
matter, particularly from Asia to the United States. Even air
pollutants that have primarily local effects are known to be affected
144
by long-range transport mechanisms. For example, ozone is not
emitted directly from automobiles but instead forms as a result of the
mixing of hydrocarbons and oxides of nitrogen, some of which have
extremely long residence times in the atmosphere and are nearly
ubiquitous around the world.145
Even if regulation of CO2 under the NAAQS system were
inappropriate, it might be permissible under other provisions of the
CAA, such as section 202, which authorizes the EPA to regulate
146
The Fabricant Memorandum
emissions from motor vehicles.
concludes that CO2 is fundamentally different from the other
pollutants that the NAAQS system was designed to address, and thus
that regulation of CO2 under section 109 of the CAA is not consistent
with the purpose of the Act.147 This argument is superficially grounded
in the legal argument that statutes should be read as a whole.148
However, an equally strong canon of statutory construction is that
courts are not to discard lightly the “ordinary and obvious” meaning
of a statutory phrase.149 Here, CO2 fits the “ordinary and obvious”
150
meaning of the term “air pollutant” as defined in the CAA. The

143. Heather U. Price et al., Photochemistry, Ozone Production, and Dilution During LongRange Transport Episodes from Eurasia to the Northwest United States, 109 J. GEOPHYSICAL
RES. D23S13, 1 (2004).
144. See id. (“On the basis of observations from the 1997–2002 Photochemical Ozone
Budget of the Northeast Pacific (PHOBEA) experiments, we have identified 11 transpacific
long-range transport (LRT) episodes, which contain significantly elevated levels of [carbon
monoxide], [ozone], and aerosol scattering.”).
145. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“[O]zone is not
emitted directly into the air, but is produced by complex chemical reactions between organic
compounds (precursors) and nitrogen oxides in the presence of sunlight. . . . Sources of
precursors include automobile emissions of hydrocarbons, chemical plant emissions, and
gasoline vapors.”).
146. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2000).
147. Fabricant Memorandum, supra note 17, at 6–7.
148. See United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984) (“We do not, however, construe
statutory phrases in isolation; we read statutes as a whole.”).
149. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987):
[T]he plain language of this statute appears to settle the question before us.
Therefore, we look to the legislative history to determine only whether there is
“clearly expressed legislative intention” contrary to that language, which would
require us to question the strong presumption that Congress expresses its intent
through the language it chooses.
150.

See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
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Memorandum’s contention—that the EPA’s past actions concerning
localized pollutants that appear lower in the atmosphere constrain the
EPA—contradicts the EPA’s congressional mandate to protect
151
human welfare, which includes protecting climate. In explicitly
using the word “climate,” Congress could not have intended to
prohibit the EPA from regulating widespread pollutants. The
Fabricant Memorandum’s argument that the CAA as a whole
precludes this reading rests on a policy decision that the NAAQS
system is unsuitable for regulation of CO2. However, the Supreme
Court has made clear that challenges based on the wisdom of agency
152
policy must fail.
In Brown & Williamson the Court found regulation of tobacco
under the FDCA logically inconsistent with the clearly expressed
intent of Congress because a “fundamental precept” of the FDCA
153
was that any drug on the market must be safe. The FDA conclusion
that tobacco products were unsafe would “require the FDA to
remove them from the market entirely.”154 However, banning tobacco
would “contradict Congress’s clear intent as expressed in its more
155
Although this logic is
recent, tobacco-specific legislation.”
reasonable in the case of tobacco, it does not apply to the case of CO2.
The fundamental principle of the CAA, as its title evidences, is to
reduce air pollution that poses a threat to human health, welfare, and
the environment. CO2 regulations would require a record
demonstrating that unchecked CO2 emissions would have a
deleterious impact on human welfare and the environment.156
Therefore, regulating CO2 would be entirely consistent with the
purpose of the CAA. The Fabricant Memorandum does not cite any
CAA provisions that prohibit the regulation of CO2, and laws passed
by Congress since the enactment of the CAA do not explicitly
preclude the EPA from regulating CO2. The logical conundrum
151. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text.
152. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984)
(“When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized,
really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice
within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail.”).
153. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 142–43 (2000).
154. Id. at 143.
155. Id.
156. See Clean Air Act § 307, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3) (2000) (“The statement of basis and
purpose shall include a summary of—(A) the factual data on which the proposed rule is based;
(B) the methodology used in obtaining the data and in analyzing the data; and (C) the major
legal interpretations and policy considerations underlying the proposed rule.”).
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presented by tobacco regulation—that defining tobacco as a drug
would force the FDA to ban tobacco—is not implicated by CO2 and
the CAA.
2. Has Congress Established a Regulatory Scheme for Carbon
Dioxide outside the Clean Air Act? The second major rationale that
the Brown & Williamson Court gave for invalidating the FDA’s
tobacco rule was that “Congress ha[d] created a distinct regulatory
scheme to address the problem of tobacco and health, and that [the]
157
scheme, as . . . constructed, preclude[d] any role for the FDA.” The
Fabricant Memorandum argues that subsequent GHG-specific
legislation demonstrates that Congress similarly precluded any role
for the EPA.158 Such legislation includes, inter alia, establishing a
“national climate program,”159 directing the coordination of
international negotiations on climate change,160 establishing a
Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences to coordinate
161
research, creating a program to research global climate and
agricultural issues,162 and calling “on the Secretary of Energy to assess
various GHG control options . . . and to establish a registry for
163
reporting voluntary GHG reductions.”

157. 529 U.S. at 144.
158. See Fabricant Memorandum, supra note 17, at 8:
While Congress did not expressly preclude agencies from taking regulatory action
under other statutes, its actions strongly indicate that when Congress was amending
the CAA in 1990, it was awaiting further information before deciding itself whether
regulation to address global climate change is warranted and, if so, what form it
should take.
Fabricant further points out that amendments and bills seeking to control GHG emissions failed
to pass, both during and after enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. Id. Finally,
during Kyoto Protocol negotiations, the Senate passed the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, resolving
that the United States should not become a party to any GHG-reduction treaty if it “would
result in serious harm to the economy of the United States.” S. Res. 98, 105th Cong., 143 CONG.
REC. 10,780 (1997). The Fabricant Memorandum argues that, taken together, congressional
actions since initial passage of the CAA indicate that the CAA did not provide the EPA the
regulatory authority to regulate CO2. See Fabricant Memorandum, supra note 17, at 8.
159. National Climate Program Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2908 (2000).
160. Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2951–2953 (2000).
161. Global Change Research Act of 1990, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2931–2938 (2000).
162. The Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6701–6710
(2000).
163. Fabricant Memorandum, supra note 17, at 8; see also Energy Policy Act of 1992, 42
U.S.C. § 13,384 (2000) (“[T]he Secretary shall transmit a report to Congress containing a
comparative assessment of alternative policy mechanisms for reducing the generation of
greenhouse gases.”); id. § 13,385(b) (“[T]he Secretary shall . . . issue guidelines for the voluntary
collection and reporting of information on sources of greenhouse gases. Such guidelines shall
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Recent CO2-related acts passed by Congress—which have been
targeted at promoting research, recording voluntary GHG emission
reductions, and coordinating international negotiations—are in stark
contrast to the comprehensive tobacco regulation scheme that
Congress has enacted. This tobacco-specific regulation requires that
health warnings appear on cigarette packages and on print and
outdoor advertisements, prohibits tobacco advertising through
electronic media, and conditions grants to states on their prohibiting
tobacco sales to persons under the age of eighteen.164 At least one of
these acts was found to preempt state regulation of cigarette
advertising based on the “comprehensive scheme” of the federal
regulations.165 The tobacco regulatory scheme that Congress
developed over time contains mandatory controls on tobacco sales
and advertising and expressly coerces the states to change their
tobacco control laws by threatening to withhold federal funds. As the
Brown & Williamson Court made clear, Congress passed these laws
knowing that the FDA had long denied having the authority to
regulate tobacco.166
In contrast, the limited GHG-specific legislation that Congress
has passed since the enactment of the CAA is not comprehensive.
The legislation imposes no controls, mandatory or otherwise. Unlike
the FDA, which had long denied that it had the legal authority to
regulate tobacco, the EPA apparently had no official opinion on the
issue until Administrator Browner testified before Congress,
precipitating the drafting of the Cannon Memorandum.167 Finally, it is
doubtful that the GHG-specific acts passed by Congress, whether
taken individually or together, would preempt regulation of CO2 by
individual states.168 Congress likely did not intend to preclude any
possible EPA regulation of GHGs by mentioning CO2 only in general
terms in a few acts.
establish procedures for the accurate voluntary reporting of information on . . . reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions achieved as a result of—(i) voluntary reductions . . . .”).
164. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143–44 (2000).
165. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 570 (2001) (“Congress enacted a
comprehensive scheme to address cigarette smoking and health in advertising and pre-empted
state regulation of cigarette advertising that attempts to address that same concern, even with
respect to youth.”).
166. See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159.
167. See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.
168. For a general discussion on preemption and global climate change issues, in particular
involving California, see Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 299–303 (2003).
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3. Does the Potential Economic Impact of a Carbon Dioxide
Rule Preclude the EPA from Promulgating Regulations? In addition
to being consistent with the structure of the CAA and unaffected by
subsequent congressional actions, CO2 regulations would also satisfy
the third prong of the Brown & Williamson test—that courts will not
infer authority to make decisions of the utmost “economic and
169
political significance” from cryptic delegations. The Fabricant
Memorandum claims in part that regulation of CO2 should be
170
prohibited because of the economic importance of the problem. It
argues that because of the “unusually profound implications of global
climate change regulation” it is unreasonable to conclude that, in
enacting a general statute such as the CAA, Congress intended to
171
regulate CO2.
Although potential CO2 regulations could undeniably have a
significant effect on the U.S. economy, the EPA is prohibited from
considering the cost of regulatory compliance when setting
NAAQS.172 Furthermore, it is questionable that CO2 regulations
would have more severe economic consequences than those resulting
from the regulation of pollutants for which NAAQS already have
been established. For example, courts have upheld NAAQS for lead173
169. See Fabricant Memorandum, supra note 17, at 9 (“In view of the unusually profound
implications of global climate change regulation, it is unreasonable to believe that Congress
intended ‘to delegate a decision of such economic and political significance . . . in so cryptic a
fashion.’” (omission in original) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.
120, 160 (2000))).
170. Specifically, it argues:
[R]egulation to address global climate change would have even greater potential
significance than the regulation of tobacco . . . . To the extent significant reductions in
U.S. CO2 emissions were mandated by EPA, power generation and transportation
would have to undergo widespread and wholesale transformations, affecting every
sector of the nation’s economy and threatening its overall economic health.
Id.
171. Id.
172. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001) (“The text of § 109(b),
interpreted in its statutory and historical context and with appreciation for its importance to the
CAA as a whole, unambiguously bars cost considerations from the NAAQS-setting process, and
thus ends the matter for us as well as the EPA.”).
173. See, e.g., Lead Indus. Ass’n. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1980):
The national ambient air quality standards for lead were the culmination of a process
of rigorous scientific and public review which permitted a thorough ventilation of the
complex scientific and technical issues presented by this rulemaking proceeding.
Interested parties were allowed a number of opportunities to participate in
exploration and resolution of the issues raised by the standard-setting exercise. EPA,
and ultimately the public whose health these air quality standards protect, have
benefitted from their contribution. To be sure, even the experts did not always agree
about the answers to the questions that were raised. Indeed, they did not always agree
on what the relevant questions were. These disagreements underscore the novelty
and complexity of the issues that had to be resolved, and both the EPA and the
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174
and ozone despite their potential to affect the economy severely
and adversely.175 Furthermore, the Brown & Williamson decision
considered the economic significance of tobacco regulation as a
supplemental, rather than a primary, factor in the analysis, as
indicated by the decision’s relatively brief treatment of economics
compared to its analysis of statutory consistency and congressional
preemption. Even assuming arguendo that the EPA could consider
costs when setting NAAQS, the two main rationales that the Court
relied upon in rejecting the tobacco regulations are absent. Unlike
tobacco, regulation of CO2 is consistent with the structure and
purpose of the CAA, and subsequent congressional action did not
create a comprehensive scheme of CO2 regulation that would
preclude EPA action.

CONCLUSION
Although regulation of CO2 may or may not be wise as a policy
matter, it is clear that Congress granted the EPA broad authority to
regulate air pollutants. Under a straightforward reading of the CAA,
CO2 meets the statutory definition of an air pollutant. Neither the
legislative history of the CAA nor the legislative history of its
amendments indicates that Congress intended to modify or reduce
the EPA’s authority to apply the statute to CO2. Absent conclusive
evidence of legislative intent to the contrary, a proposed rule applying
the CAA to CO2 would warrant deference from the courts. Finally,
the EPA’s current reliance on Brown & Williamson to argue that it
does not have the authority to regulate CO2 is misguided, because

participants in the rulemaking proceeding deserve to be commended for the diligence
with which they approached the task of coming to grips with these difficult issues.
We have accorded these cases the most careful consideration, combining as we
must careful scrutiny of the evidence in the record with deference to the
Administrator’s judgments. We conclude that in this rulemaking proceeding the
Administrator complied with the substantive and procedural requirements of the Act,
and that his decisions are both adequately explained and amply supported by
evidence in the record.
174. See, e.g., Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“The
petitions for review . . . challenge the primary and secondary national ambient air quality
standards for ozone promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency . . . . We uphold the
ozone standards because they are proper under the Act and such procedural errors as did occur
do not require invalidation of the final standards.”).
175. In fact, the Supreme Court upheld the NAAQS for lead even though the “technology
forcing” requirements of the CAA mandated the use of pollution control technologies that were
economically infeasible. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 647 F.2d at 1149.
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none of the three factors analyzed in that decision is present in the
case of CO2.
Even though courts would likely uphold a CO2 rule supported by
sufficient findings, the Bush administration is in no hurry to
promulgate CO2 regulations, as evidenced by its refusal to regulate
176
CO2 in motor vehicle exhaust and its eagerness to misapply Brown
& Williamson to deny that the EPA has the authority to act.177
Although environmentalists may question the wisdom of postponing
regulation, the decision to regulate is a policy decision properly
within the purview of the executive branch, especially because, in this
case, the CAA does not seem ideally suited to address the global
climate change issue. Given that climate change is a truly global issue,
an international solution is ideal, either in the form of the current
Kyoto Protocol178 or in some new international accord. Although an
international solution is preferable, the EPA’s authority to regulate
CO2 under the CAA remains a legally viable, if partial, solution to the
global climate change issue.

176. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922,
59,933 (Sept. 8, 2003).
177. Despite Vice President Gore’s interest in global climate change, the Clinton
administration was also not eager to regulate CO2. For a general review of climate change policy
under the Clinton administration, see Amy Royden, U.S. Climate Change Policy Under
President Clinton: A Look Back, 32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 415 (2002).
178. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 32.

